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1. This is an appeal against the decision of the late 
District Judge Millard handed down on 12th November 
2012. The claim is brought by Mr Shojibur Rahman 
against Barclays Bank plc. By his claim the claimant 
sought to be reimbursed in the sum of £23,915.76, 
with interest, in respect of money that was paid from 
his account in consequences of the fraudulent activity 
of an unknown third party. It is the claimant’s case 
that the bank dealt with this account negligently 
and in breach of their contractual obligation to him, 
and consequently he is entitled to recoup his losses 
from them. The defendant bank deny that they are 
obliged to repay to the claimant the money which he 
now seeks. In a reserved judgment, the District Judge 
rejected the claim, save as to the sum of £6,230.28, 
with interest of £989.40. The appellant submits that 
the District Judge was wrong and invites the court to 
hold that he is entitled to the entire sum claimed, with 
interest, and asks that this court should substitute its 
findings for that of the District Judge. The respondent 
bank has not cross-appealed but seeks to uphold the 
District Judge’s judgment. It concedes, on the basis 
of proportionality, that this court should deal with the 
appeal, in any event, so as to achieve finality.
2. Permission to appeal was not granted by the District 
Judge. I directed that there should be an oral hearing 
of the appellant’s application for permission to 
appeal and that, if granted, the appeal would follow 
on afterwards. Having heard oral argument, I granted 
permission to appeal on some but not all of the 
grounds relied upon.
3. The Background: The transactions complained of 
occurred in the middle of November 2008. By then 
the claimant had been a customer of the bank for 
some two or three years. He was a bus driver who 
had managed to amass some £24,400 in a bonus 
savings account with the bank and also had in 
his current account some £2,300. Between 14th 
and 20th November 2008 inclusive, a number of 
transactions took place using the claimant’s debit 
card for his current account to make withdrawals 
from cash machines or substantial purchases. The 
largest purchase was of a Rolex watch from Watches 
of Switzerland. Its price was £14,420. In all, the 
transactions which resulted in money leaving the 
appellant’s current account came to £23,915.76. 
Since the discovery of the disputed transactions, the 
claimant has been consistent in his version of what 
happened and has vigorously pursued his claim 
against the bank, taking it as far as he could through 
the bank’s internal procedures, reporting the matter 
to the police, asking his Member of Parliament for 
assistance and making a complaint to the Financial 
Ombudsman. Ultimately, these proceedings were 
issued on 8th April 2011.
4. The account which the appellant gave throughout, to 
the bank and to the police and to the others whom 
I have just mentioned, and which he pleaded in his 
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pleadings dated 1st April 2011 and repeated in his 
witness statement dated 14th June 2011 and again at 
the hearing before the District Judge in October 2012, 
was, in important respects, plainly and deliberately 
untruthful, and the District Judge so found. That part 
of her findings has not been, and patently could not 
sensibly be, appealed. In essence, the claimant said 
that he had received a phone call shortly after 3 p.m. 
on Thursday, 13th November 2008 whilst he was 
at work driving his bus. At that point he had briefly 
stopped, so that he was able to answer the telephone. 
He said that a man calling himself Stewart said that 
he was calling from Barclays fraud department and 
that Mr Rahman’s debit account was being used at 
Argos in Camden. Mr Rahman confirmed that he was 
not using the card and told Stewart to cancel the card 
immediately. Stewart told him that this would be 
done. During this phone call Mr Rahman asserted that 
he checked his wallet where he had always kept his 
debit card and discovered it was missing.
 He subsequently received more telephone calls from 
the same number, which he was unable to answer 
because he was driving. He then received a text 
message containing a reference number and asking 
him to call the same number from which the earlier 
telephone call had been received, namely 0870 283 
2274. When he finished his shift at about 4 p.m., he 
said that he telephoned the number and spoke to 
Stewart again, who assured him that everything was 
okay and the card had been cancelled.
 Mr Rahman’s case is that nothing further happened 
until the following night, Friday, 14th November, when 
he decided to telephone the defendant’s dedicated 
lost and stolen cards telephone number at about 10.30 
in the evening to inquire what was happening. He was 
told about several transactions which had taken place 
on his account that day, including a transfer from his 
bonus savings account. He was at that stage speaking 
to somebody called Matthew, and he told Matthew 
that he had not authorised any of the transactions, 
including the transfer. He told Matthew to freeze his 
account and cancel his debit card, which Matthew 
agreed to do. It is the appellant’s case that he tried 
to go to his branch on the following day, Saturday, 
15th November, but the branch and the neighbouring 
branches in Camden and Kentish Town were closed.
 So, it was not until Monday, 17th November that he 
was able to go to his branch and discuss the matter. 
He discovered that his card had not in fact been 
cancelled on 14th November. His personal banking 
manager ensured that the card was stopped at 9.55 
that day.
5. The District Judge found, for reasons I will come 
to presently, that in fact the appellant had not lost 
his debit card as he alleged. The telephone calls 
that he had on 13th November were not from a 
representative of the bank, but from an unknown 
fraudster, who proceeded, for want of a better word, 
to con him into parting with his credit1 card in the 
belief that he was giving it to a messenger sent by 
Barclays Bank to collect it. The District Judge further 
concluded, for reasons I will also come to presently, 
that it was likely that the appellant had provided the 
fraudster on the telephone or otherwise with a vital 
information which he should not have parted with, 
which enabled the fraudster to more or less empty the 
appellant’s account. It is that latter series of findings, 
as to the information disclosed, which the appellant 
challenges as being without evidential foundation and 
unavailable to the District Judge to make. It will be 
apparent that the alleged contents of the conversation 
between the appellant and the person purporting to 
be from Barclays fraud department on 13th November 
could not have been on the basis of the appellant’s 
debit card having been lost as alleged.
 The uncovering of the false nature of the appellant’s 
case about whether he had lost his credit2 card as he 
had alleged throughout, or parted with it as a result 
of the fraudulent ruse, was uncovered quite late 
in the day by the bank’s investigation department. 
Evidence was given before the District Judge by the 
bank’s investigation intelligence manager. It seems, 
and it is not challenged, that in early 2012 it occurred 
to the bank for the first time that the appellant’s case 
had some of the key features of a scam known as 
‘Operation O’. According to the bank’s investigation 
intelligence manager, the pattern of this fraud was 
that the bank’s customers would receive a telephone 
call from someone purporting to be from the bank’s 
fraud department saying that the customer’s account 
had been subject to fraudulent activity. The customers 
would be told that, in order to cancel their cards or to 
investigate, the bank would require the customer’s 
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card, the corresponding PIN number and other 
personal information. The customer would be told 
that a courier would be sent to collect the card and 
the relevant information. The card was then collected 
and delivered to an address in the Gray’s Inn area. 
The fraudster would be waiting by the address for the 
courier to arrive and take possession of the card and 
other information. It would seem that respectable 
couriers were frequently employed.
 The bank considered that Mr Rahman might have 
been a victim of this fraud because the telephone 
number used to telephone him on 13th November, and 
which he used to call back, has in fact been associated 
with other examples of Operation O cases on some 
18 occasions. On 28 occasions the caller identified 
himself as Stewart. Quite often, the bank card would 
first be used at an ATM operated by Lloyd’s Bank 
at 344 Gray’s Inn Road. It is significant that the 
first transaction complained of in this case is the 
withdrawal of £300 from that bank. The defendant in 
this case knew that the well known courier company, 
Addison Lee, had been used by the fraudster in some 
of the cases to collect cards. They made enquiries 
of Addison Lee and produced evidence before the 
District Judge from Linda Ibrahim, one of that firm’s 
employees. She had checked Addison Lee’s computer, 
which showed that at 9.45 a.m. on 14th November 
a booking was made for a direct, immediate pick up 
by motorbike from the claimant’s address at Flat 22, 
Sanfield, Cromer Street, WC1H 8DU. Material collected 
was then delivered to 280 Gray’s Inn Road, WC1X 8EB. 
The caller who had commissioned the pick up gave 
his name as Stewart Catterwell and a mobile phone 
number. Addison Lee’s computer records showed 
that the item was collected from the address given 
and delivered at 17 minutes past 10 on Friday, 14th 
November 2008. The fee was paid in cash.
 The appellant, Mr Rahman, denied that he had given 
any personal or secure information to Stewart over 
the telephone on 13th November. Before the District 
Judge, he was adamant that he had not been asked to 
send his card, PIN number or any other information by 
courier to Barclays. He also denied that any envelope 
had been collected from him or from his address on 
Friday, 14th November. He accepted that on that day 
he was at home at around 10 a.m. when the package 
would have been collected.
 The District Judge reached the conclusion that a 
material part of his evidence about the conduct of 
the phone call he had had with the fraudster was 
untruthful. She came to the conclusion that he was 
not being truthful about that or the events of the 
morning of 14th November. She formed the view on 
the evidence before her that it was more likely that 
the purpose of the telephone call was to obtain the 
card and the information to enable it to be used, in 
accordance with the usual modus operandi of this 
type of fraud. Thus, she held that the appellant’s 
account of how he parted from his card was in fact a 
lie and it could only have been a completely deliberate 
lie which the appellant had maintained over a period 
and in the face of the court. I think it appropriate that 
I should refer expressly to part of the District Judge’s 
judgment at this point. At paragraph 13 she said this:
 ‘Despite Mr Rahman’s denial that any package 
was collected from his home on the morning of 14 
November, I accept the information extracted from 
Addison Lee’s computer system is accurate. There 
is no reason for Ms Ibrahim or anyone at Addison 
Lee to lie about this. Again, it is impossible to see 
what benefit it would be to the fraudsters to make 
this booking and pay the courier if not to collect Mr 
Rahman’s card and other information.’
 She went on to expressly reject a speculative 
concoction maintained by the appellant that he 
might have left his debit card at a branch of the bank 
accidentally in September 2008 and she rejected 
the disingenuous suggestion, to which the claimant 
must have known there was no foundation, that 
there was some fraudulent involvement on the part 
of an employee of the bank who had access to the 
appellant’s card.
 After the card was handed over, as the District Judge 
found, as is common ground, that a number of 
transactions took place. It will be recalled that the 
card, according to the records of Addison Lee, was 
dropped off in the Gray’s Inn Road at 10.17 on 14th 
November 2008. The first withdrawal using the card 
and its PIN number was made 17 minutes later at 
the ATM of Lloyd’s Bank in the Gray’s Inn Road. The 
sum of £300 was taken and the evidence showed 
that the PIN number was presented accurately and 
used without difficulty on the first occasion. The 
next transaction was for £14,420 and that was the 
expensive Rolex watch. It took place some four and 
a half hours later at the premises of Watches of 
Switzerland. However, in the meantime, the sum of 
£20,400 was transferred as the result of a telephone 
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instruction from the appellant’s Super Saver account 
to his current account. Without that intermediate 
step, it would not have been possible to have made 
the withdrawals from the appellant’s account to 
cover the watch transaction; there would have been a 
shortfall of well over £10,000. In addition to the watch 
transaction, there were three further transactions that 
day totalling an additional £2,665.48. The swiftness 
and effectiveness with which the fraudsters moved to 
withdraw cash and to restructure the appellant’s cash 
holdings in his account convinced the bank and the 
District Judge that they could not have been achieved 
without the PIN and other information having been 
disclosed to them. On that basis, the bank and the 
District Judge concluded that the claimant had been 
negligent and had parted with the debit card and 
sensitive information in a way which discharged the 
bank from any indemnity to reimburse him.
6. The bank relied upon a constellation of factors. 
They came to their conclusion because their records 
showed that the debit card that was used was actually 
the debit card which had been issued to Mr Rahman 
and not a cloned card. The PIN had been correctly 
entered at the first attempt for all transactions. In 
addition, the person who used the card at Watches 
of Switzerland has correctly answered some identity 
verification questions. Furthermore, the telephone 
transfer of £20,400 from the bonus savings account to 
the current account could only have been completed 
if either the caller had correctly3 entered on the 
telephone keypad the sort code, account number, 
passcode and registration key, or alternatively have 
it done by actually speaking to a member of Barclays’ 
staff and in that conversation correctly answering 
some identification questions. Despite the appellant’s 
persistent lies, the bank did not allege that the 
appellant was personally involved in the fraud. The 
District Judge expressly found that he was not.
7. Although not wholly material to this appeal, I should 
explain briefly what happened towards the end of 
the fraudulent activities with the debit card and 
what it was that caused the District Judge to find in 
part for the appellant. As I have said, the appellant’s 
case was that late on Friday, 14th November 2008 he 
had telephoned the bank and discussed the events 
which had occurred, or at least his version of the 
events which had occurred. As a result of what was 
clearly a long conversation, he gave instructions that 
his debit card should be cancelled, and the bank’s 
representative agreed to do so. The bank maintained 
that it was not notified of the situation until the 
appellant called into his local branch early on 17th 
November 2008. The appellant maintains that he 
notified the bank on the evening of 14th of November, 
in the telephone call to which I have just referred. The 
bank denied having any record of the telephone call 
from the appellant on 14th of November 2008. The 
appellant produced his itemised telephone records 
showing that a call was made from his telephone to 
the bank’s dedicated lost and stolen card number on 
14th of November at 20 minutes to midnight, and it 
lasted for 38 or more minutes. The District Judge said:
‘27. … There seems no reason not to accept that 
the claimant’s telephone bill shows that the 
call was in fact made. It lasted a long time. It is 
not suggested by the defendants that callers 
at that time were put on hold for such a long 
period before speaking to a call operator. In the 
absence of any evidence from the defendant as 
to the content of this conversation, I find that the 
claimant’s evidence with regard to this telephone 
call is probably correct and that he did speak to 
somebody at the lost and stolen card department. 
It is understandable that he would phone to find 
out what is happening. It is difficult to believe that 
he did not make it clear that he did not authorise 
the transactions and that his debit card should be 
cancelled.
28. I find that the defendant should have cancelled 
the claimant’s debit card by 00.20 on 15 November 
2008 and the bank should re-credit to Mr 
Rahman’s account any debits made using his card 
after that time.’
 It is, thus, in relation to the remaining sum claimed in 
the case by the appellant that this appeal is brought. 
The appellant hopes to recover the balance of 
£17,385.48.
8. I gave permission to appeal on ground 1 in its general 
thrust and specifically in relation to aspects of 
subparagraphs (a) and (b). Ground 1 reads:
‘At paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment, the 
finding of fact by the learned judge that Mr 
Rahman must have disclosed telephone banking 
security procedures to the fraudster, who “tricked” 
case on appeal: england & Wales
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him into so doing, and used these details to access 
the claimant’s bank account to enable the transfer 
of £20,400 from his savings account to his current 
account, is unsupported by the evidence and 
wrong.’
 It was contended that, just because the fraudster may 
have had information, it could not be said that it came 
from the appellant. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) under 
ground 1 read as follows:
‘The evidence before the judge was that Mr 
Rahman, despite having a number of bank 
accounts with both the defendant and other banks, 
has never taken steps to register or even use 
telephone banking at any bank. Mr Rahman did 
not feel comfortable banking over the telephone 
and always attended banks in person. No other 
evidence was available to contradict this.’
 These facts were relied upon to demonstrate that the 
District Judge could not reasonably have inferred that 
the information came from the appellant. At (b) under 
ground 1, it was said:
‘The terms and conditions of telephone banking 
with the bank state:
“Before we can act on instructions given to 
us by telephone or computer, we will agree 
security procedures with you.”
The bank was unable to adduce details of any 
telephone banking agreed security procedures 
that it had in place with Mr Rahman as required by 
its terms and conditions before telephone banking 
instructions could be taken.’
 As an aspect of that, I allowed it to be argued that the 
District Judge could not appropriately have concluded 
that the relevant information would necessarily have 
come from Mr Rahman and not the fraudster, in the 
absence of any evidence from the bank as to the 
actual nature of the security procedures carried out by 
it. The ground goes to the transfer of funds between 
the appellant’s accounts without which it is said the 
fraud could not have taken place. The appellant’s case 
is that the bank should not have permitted the transfer 
and, in so far as it did, on the basis of telephone 
instructions, it did so wrongly. The evidential findings 
were recorded by the District Judge at paragraphs 15 
and 16 and 32 of her judgment. At paragraphs 15 and 
16 she said, amongst other things:
‘I also find that during his telephone calls with 
Stuart on 13 November and/or in the documents 
or information included with the card given to the 
courier on 14 November, Mr Rahman disclosed 
enough sensitive information to enable the 
fraudsters to use the card and to know he had a 
Bonus Savings account and roughly how much 
was in it.’
 At paragraph 16 she said:
… [Mr Rahman] was tricked into handing over 
his debit card and information needed by the 
fraudsters to use it (although his subsequent 
behaviour in concealing the full truth when dealing 
with the bank, financial ombudsman and the court 
was dishonest).’
 At paragraphs 30 to 32, the District Judge said the 
following:
‘30. Mr Rahman denies he has ever registered 
for telephone banking although the defendant’s 
records show that he registered on 27 May 2006 
(9 days after opening his Bonus Saver account). It 
was suggested by the defendant’s Investigations 
Intelligence Manager, Mr Holmes, that it was 
possible that this as been arranged while Mr 
Rahman was in the branch on other matters and 
he may not have realised that he was registered. In 
any event, it seems to be accepted that he had not 
used telephone banking before 14 November. On 
balance, I accept that Mr Rahman was registered 
for telephone banking in 2006. It was not set up as 
part of the scam of November 2008.
31. Unfortunately, the defendant has not been 
able to produce any information as to the precise 
way in which the transfer was effected. Its records 
show it was over the telephone but not whether 
this was by speaking to someone at a call centre or 
automatically by keying in the sort code, account 
number, passcode and registration key. If the 
latter method was used, then I would find on the 
balance of probabilities that the transfer was made 
possible only because the claimant disclosed the 
necessary information to the fraudsters. If the 
former method was used, the claimant would 
argue that the defendant’s employee did not 
exercise sufficient care in checking the identity 
of the caller particularly as he has no history of 
dealing with such transfers over the telephone, he 
has always gone into the branch.
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32. As we do not know whether the fraudsters 
spoke to the defendant’s employee over the 
telephone, we do not know what identity 
verification questions he was asked and whether 
he answered them correctly. Verifying the identity 
of callers is such a routine matter for banks, it 
seems unlikely that this was not done. Bearing in 
mind that this was a transfer from one account in 
the name of the claimant to another account in his 
name, there is no reason for the bank’s employee 
to be as suspicious as he might be if the payment 
were to a third party.’
9. The appellant’s pleaded case on the telephone 
banking issue is to be found at paragraph 8 of the 
particulars of claim. Paragraph 8 says:
‘The fraudsters had set up a telephone banking 
facility over his account and transferred £20,400 
from his savings account to his current account on 
the 14th November 2008.’
 The District Judge made no specific finding about 
the setting up of a telephone banking facility by the 
fraudsters. There was no evidence before her that 
that had been done. Indeed, it would seem that such 
facility was already in place. What she concluded 
was that what the bank would have done as a matter 
of course would have been to identity the caller 
before transferring funds from one of the appellant’s 
accounts to the other. There was no question that 
the appellant was the caller and the bank clearly 
erred in its identification of the caller, but the District 
Judge was satisfied that the appellant was sufficiently 
responsible for the error, by reason of the release of 
his debit card bearing confidential information and the 
giving of other information to the fraudster, to relieve 
the bank of ultimate responsibility.
 I am satisfied that she was entitled to come to 
that conclusion on the evidence before her. It was 
reasonable to draw the inference that, in addition to 
passing over the debit card, the appellant passed over 
other confidential information. The fact that cash had 
been withdrawn from the ATM soon after the card had 
been delivered to the fraudster, using effectively the 
PIN, had weighed with the bank and clearly influenced 
the District Judge. The District Judge found that the 
purpose of the telephone call which the appellant 
had with the fraudster had been for the purpose of 
obtaining not only the card but also information to 
enable its use. She concluded that it as also probable 
that the transfer was possible only because the 
appellant disclosed the necessary information to the 
fraudster.
 The bank did not put before the court any detailed 
evidence about the security information it sought from 
the fraudster. It had no record of that transaction, save 
in general terms. In giving leave to appeal, I accepted 
that this court should consider whether, without 
knowing what information was used on this occasion, 
the District Judge might infer that the appellant had 
provided the fraudster with information, rather than 
that the fraudster had tricked the information from the 
bank. I am satisfied that the District Judge was entitled 
to make the finding which she did and to draw the 
inference which she did. It must be remembered that 
she did not have a truthful account of the conversation 
between the appellant and the fraudster provided 
to her; the only account she had was the appellant’s 
persistent lies. I am satisfied that it was open to her to 
conclude that the most probable source of the type of 
information used by the fraudster was the appellant. 
Even if the District Judge was wrong about that, I am 
mindful of the fact that the transfer of funds from one 
account of the appellant’s accounts to another caused 
him no loss. It was the extraction of funds from the 
current account by the use of the debit card which led 
to the loss.
10. As to ground 1(b), it does not appear that the question 
of whether there had been agreed security procedures 
in accordance with the bank’s published terms had 
formed part of the appellant’s pleaded case. Before 
the District Judge, the pleaded case had, rather, been 
that the fraudster had set up telephone banking 
facilities, and the District Judge had found that not 
to be the case. The issue of any breach of contract in 
relation to setting up telephone banking and when it 
had occurred was not part of the evidence. I accept 
that the District Judge resolved the pleaded issue in 
her judgment and she cannot now be criticised for not 
resolving a matter which had not been pleaded before 
her.
11. It is convenient here to explain why I refused 
permission to appeal on those parts of ground 1 
of the appellant’s grounds, which are set out in 
subparagraphs (c) to (e). In applying the criteria set 
out in CPR 52.3(6),4 I am satisfied that the matters 
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 (b) there is some other compelling reason 
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relied upon at 1(c) to (e) would have no real prospect 
of success, nor is there any other compelling reason 
why permission to appeal should be granted. The fact 
that the appellant had not himself used telephone 
banking in the past for whatever reason would not 
render it improbable that he would be able to provide 
security information to the fraudster. That it was 
possible that telephone banking facilities set up 
shortly after the appellant’s bank account had been 
opened may have been done without his knowledge 
is immaterial to the matters found by the District 
Judge and to the appellant’s case that the fraudster 
set up telephone banking. Similarly, there is no 
substance in the suggestion that the District Judge 
gave inadequate weight to the appellant’s inferior 
knowledge of the English language as being material 
to her considerations. She saw and heard him and 
was capable of deciding whether the issue was of 
sufficient materiality to be referred to. Sitting in these 
courts, an experienced judge such as this District 
Judge weights constantly the impact of language 
problems, and I cannot for one moment think that that 
would have been out of her mind here.
12. I did not grant permission to the appellant to pursue 
the second ground of his notice of appeal, again on 
the basis of the criteria set out in CPR 52.3(6). The 
ground complained of the District Judge’s approach 
to the first major transaction, namely the purchase 
of the very expensive Rolex watch from Watches 
of Switzerland, some five hours after the appellant 
parted with possession of his card. The District Judge 
had considered what had happened with the bank 
at that stage. The card had been presented to the 
retailer. She identified that there was an issue as to 
whether the bank breached its terms and conditions 
and was negligent in authorising the Watches of 
Switzerland transaction. She dealt with that at 
paragraph 33 of her judgment. There she said:
‘33. The defendant has been able to produce 
information as to the questions which were asked 
of the fraudster in the Watches of Switzerland 
shop. The defendant’s internal report shows 
that the fraudster was asked first all how long 
the account had been open. The answer was 10 
years or something. That answer would not be 
accepted as it is quite vague. (The account was in 
fact opened some 3 years earlier in August 2005). 
The next question was where his account holding 
branch was and this was answered correctly. He 
was also asked whom he shared the account with 
and the again this was answered correctly (i.e. 
no one). He was asked how long he had been 
at his current address. The answer was “all my 
life” which the report notes is quite vague (I do 
not have any evidence as to the correct answer 
for this question). The fraudster said that he was 
buying a wedding present for his brother. As has 
been pointed out on behalf of the claimant, the 
two answers which were correct (i.e. that the 
account was in his sole name and that the holding 
branch was King’s Cross) may have been gleaned 
from the debit card itself which contains the sort 
code and gave no indication that there was any 
other person named on the account. Equally, the 
information could have been disclosed by Mr 
Rahman in his telephone calls with Stuart or in the 
information he handed over to the courier. It is of 
relevance that these questions were asked in the 
context of the genuine card being used and the 
PIN being entered correctly first time and was for 
an amount which was covered by an apparently 
authorised recent large transfer from the Bonus 
Saver account.
34. The claimant has also pointed to the fact 
that the pattern of use of his accounts from 14 
November was different from his usual pattern. 
Although he had transferred large sums from 
his Bonus Saver account before, this had been 
done by attendance at the bank rather than by 
telephone. There were several ATM balance 
enquiries whereas he rarely used ATMs. In fact 
he rarely used his debit card at all but it was used 
frequently in the period in question, generally for 
comparatively small sums in High Street shops. 
However, customers do change their spending 
patterns on occasion such as when on holiday 
or for a particular reason. They also become 
irate (and it causes them embarrassment and 
inconvenience) if their card is blocked when they 
try to use it for a genuine transaction. Looking 
at the record of transactions on 14 November, I 
am not satisfied that the defendant should have 
suspected unauthorised use on that date.
35. Taking into account the context in which 
these two transactions (transfer from the Bonus 
Saver account and payment to Watches of 
Switzerland) were made and the fact that we do 
not know precisely what information the claimant 
disclosed to the fraudster, I do not find that the 
defendant has breached contractual obligations 
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 5  Editorial note: the transcript has ‘credit 
card’, but the judge probably meant ‘debit 
card’. This is probably a minor slip.
or the Banking Code 2008 or that it has been 
negligent. Therefore, the claimant is liable for the 
all losses until 00:20 on 15 November 2008 but the 
defendant should reimburse him for debits after 
that time.’
 The ground of appeal complained that two of the 
answers were seriously incorrect. In fact, the District 
Judge had no evidence about the incorrectness of 
one of them, or of the information held by the bank 
on that subject. The fact that the answers were vague 
in the context of the telephone call and the other 
matters pointed to by the District Judge did not, in her 
judgment, constitute significant grounds for holding 
that the bank had acted in breach of duty in not 
refusing to authorise the use of the appellant’s credit5 
card when accompanied by the correct PIN number. 
I am content that she was entitled to reach that 
conclusion. There was insufficient substance in the 
matters complained of to justify permission to appeal 
being given.
13. I gave permission to appeal in respect of the third 
ground of appeal, but only as to part. The appellant 
complained in the first part of ground 3 of his grounds 
of appeal that:
‘The judge’s inference that he did not use 
reasonable care on 13th and 14th November 
2008 is not properly explained and contradicts 
her finding that the claimant was not dishonest 
or fraudulent on those days as, “He was tricked 
into handing over his debit card and information 
needed by the fraudster to use it.”’
 I shall return to that part of paragraph 15 of the District 
Judge’s judgment in which she dealt with in this 
respect of the appellant’s case – in order to answer it, 
I think it justifies repeating the passages that I have 
already cited, in which she said:
‘I also find that during his telephone calls with 
Stuart on 13 November and/or in the documents 
or information included with the card given to the 
courier on 14 November, Mr Rahman disclosed 
enough sensitive information to enable the 
fraudsters to use the card and to know he had a 
Bonus Savings account and roughly how much 
was in it.’
 The District Judge also said, at paragraph 16:
‘I find the claimant’s conduct on 13 and 14 
November 2008 which led to the disputed 
transactions was not dishonest or fraudulent 
because he was tricked into handing over his debit 
card and information needed by the fraudsters 
to use it (although his subsequent behaviour in 
concealing the full truth when dealing with the 
bank, financial ombudsman and the court was 
dishonest). However, I find that he did not use 
reasonable care on 13 and 14 November 2008. He 
had no way of knowing that the call from Stuart 
was genuine or that the telephone number used 
belonged to the defendant. It would have been a 
simple matter for him to telephone the defendant’s 
dedicated lost or stolen card number (which he did 
late on 14 November) or contact his local branch 
before handing over his card and other information 
to the courier.’
 I am satisfied that in the circumstances the District 
Judge was entitled to find that the appellant did 
not act with reasonable care. She was satisfied that 
he had handed over his debit card to a third party. 
On its face, that is not taking reasonable care. She 
was satisfied that he parted with the PIN number 
and demonstrated why she took the view that she 
could be satisfied of that. Of course, there could be 
circumstances in which the appellant could have 
acted without personal fault. All frauds, all thefts are 
different and carry varying degrees of culpability on 
the part of the loser. The culpability of a loser who 
places a valuable object by an open window and has 
it stolen is very different from the culpability of a loser 
who has a valuable object stolen from his safe in the 
middle of the night. However, the unique feature of 
this case is that nothing in the evidence before the 
District Judge explained what was really said between 
the appellant and the fraudster. The District Judge had 
no evidence about that at all. All she had in relation 
to the transaction between the fraudster and the 
appellant was the appellant’s dishonest and false 
account of what had taken place. She had nothing to 
explain or mitigate the simple fact that the appellant 
had parted with his debit card and PIN, as she 
found. She was satisfied that it was handed over to 
a fraudster, but she was given no true account of the 
circumstances. It was not for her to guess whether it 
was done foolishly on the appellant’s part or only after 
the appellant had taken reasonable precautions. He 
was the only person before the court who could have 
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told her and he chose instead to lie.
 In the circumstances, the District Judge cannot be 
blamed for drawing the inference that she did and 
I am satisfied that an appeal on the basis that the 
District Judge acted outside the scope of reasonable 
decision-making on the evidence before her would 
not stand a reasonable prospect of success and thus it 
was not appropriate, in accordance with the criteria of 
CPR 52.3(6), to grant permission to appeal, as such an 
appeal would have no real prospect of success.
14. To some extent, the second part of the third ground of 
the appellant’s grounds of appeal is a repetition of the 
earlier argument advanced on the appellant’s behalf, 
but the addition of three further heads of argument, at 
3(a) to (c), caused me to grant permission to appeal. 
The second part of the third ground reads as follows:
‘Further, her inference at paragraph 15 of the 
judgment that Mr Rahman must have disclosed 
enough sensitive information to enable the 
fraudster to use the card and to know he had a 
bonus savings account and roughly how much 
was in it, is not supported by the evidence. These 
inferences are legally inadequate and unsupported 
by the evidence and give rise to a material error of 
law because:
(a) except for the fact that Mr Rahman’s card was 
used in conjunction with his PIN, the bank did 
not say that the judge was able to identify the 
sensitive information the claimant was tricked into 
giving to the fraudster. The bank was reminded in 
repeated pre-action correspondence to preserve 
all tape recordings of conversations concerning the 
fraudulent transactions. The bank failed to provide 
any such evidence for the trial.’
 In many ways, the extraordinary thing about this 
submission is that the appellant’s case on the appeal 
is not based upon his own case at trial, that he had 
asserted all along that he had neither parted with 
the card or the PIN to the fraudster. In so far as the 
ground refers to the use of the PIN, this ground must 
be taken to refer to the watch transaction. Debit card 
PINs are not used in telephone transactions. Thus, the 
question is whether the appellant gave the fraudster 
security information which allowed that transaction 
to proceed. It is clear that the PIN, which is, of course, 
itself security information,6 had been given to the 
fraudster and that it was the use of the card and that 
information which had initiated the transaction. The 
handing over of the card would, of course, have shown 
the sort code and gave access to the information 
about which branch the appellant banked with, but 
that information could have come from the appellant, 
as could information about his sole ownership of the 
account and the existence of other savings accounts. 
The District Judge had concluded that there had been 
a phone call in which personal banking information 
had been disclosed. She inferred, not unreasonably, 
that the appellant was in that context the most likely 
source of such information. He had, after all, been 
careless enough with his PIN. In the absence of any 
contradictory evidence, I am content that she had 
sufficient material before her to reach the conclusion 
which she did and to make the inference which she 
did.
15. At (b) of ground 3 the appellant contends that:
‘The learned judge was wrong to simply assume 
that Mr Rahman must have told the fraudster 
about his bonus share account and how much 
money he had there without any evidence. The 
learned judge failed to consider the most obvious 
way the fraudster could have obtained information 
about the amount of money in Mr Rahman’s 
savings account, namely from the bank employee 
dealing with the fraudster during the telephone 
banking in the false belief that they were dealing 
with Mr Rahman.’
 The District Judge clearly took the view that that was 
not the obvious explanation as to how the fraudster 
would have known what other accounts the appellant 
held. Indeed, it seems to me that the District Judge 
was right to find that that was far from obvious. 
Unless the fraudster had known of the additional 
account, whatever purpose would he have had in 
telephoning the bank so swiftly after receiving the 
debit card and before embarking upon the second 
and most substantial withdrawal from the current 
account, which would not have been effective without 
first having arranged the transfer? The District Judge’s 
inference can be reasonably based on the raft of 
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facts which she found, including the conduct of the 
fraudster and the appellant. I have considered the 
suggestion but have ultimately come to the conclusion 
that her finding was within reasonable parameters.
16. Ground 3(c) suggests that:
‘The learned judge failed to give adequate weight 
to the fact that the fraudsters were sophisticated 
operators and already possessed information 
relating to Mr Rahman and other customers of the 
bank. Indeed, the very least the fraudsters had to 
know was Mr Rahman’s mobile phone number and 
the fact that he banked with Barclays in order to 
dupe him into believing that he was receiving a call 
from Barclays fraud team. The official looking 0870 
number was used and Mr Rahman had received an 
authoritative text purporting to be from Barclays 
fraud department, together with a reference 
number and message advising him to call bank on 
the same 0870 number.’
 In granting permission to appeal in relation to this 
part of the third ground, I did so with some reluctance, 
but considered that the appellant’s position, as the 
victim of this scam, warranted a careful consideration 
of the balance of the evidence by the District Judge. 
Upon reflection, I am not satisfied that the criticism 
is soundly based. For example, that the fraudsters 
had the appellant’s telephone number was not in 
itself meaningful. Whether the fraudsters knew at 
the start of the conversation that the appellant had 
an account with Barclays Bank is questionable and, 
without at least an honest account of the conversation 
between the fraudster and the appellant, the District 
Judge had no way of knowing that. Nowadays, one 
is all too familiar with e-mail banking scams that 
refer to accounts which the recipient is said to have 
with one or other of the major banks, and simply as 
a fishing exercise, and I suppose in something like 
one in five cases the recipient probably does not 
have such an account. However, there is nothing 
before this court to show that the telephone call to 
the appellant was other than a fishing expedition at 
the beginning. Just how sophisticated the fraudster 
was over the telephone, in the face of the appellant’s 
false evidence, the District Judge had no way of 
knowing. It would seem from the bank’s evidence that 
the fraudster was quite experienced and, without a 
truthful account of what was said to the appellant, 
the District Judge could not know how much weight to 
attach to that.
17. I did not give permission to appeal on the last three 
aspects of the third ground, namely (d) to (f). None 
of them satisfied, either individually or collectively, 
the criteria of CPR 52.3(6) and, in any event, they 
were repetitious in many ways of other arguments 
and added nothing to the proposed appeal. 3(d) 
returned to the point of the District Judge finding that 
the appellant did not use reasonable care and the 
assertion that it was speculative and irrational. On 
the basis that it was based on her primary findings as 
to the appellant’s conduct, I am satisfied that it was 
not irrational. The inferences were, for the reasons 
which she expressed, open to her to draw. In the 
absence of a full and honest account, she cannot be 
criticised for so doing. Grounds 3(e) to (f) need not be 
considered at this stage in detail as they have already 
been considered in the course of this judgment and it 
will be apparent that I do not regard them as having 
substance.
18. Finally, in relation to the fourth ground, I should 
explain why I did not give permission to appeal in 
relation to that. It was, in effect, a repetition of an 
earlier ground but, in so far as it was not, I am satisfied 
that it provided no substantial argument in favour 
of the appellant’s case on appeal. In essence, it is 
submitted, as far as it can be followed, that the District 
Judge had been satisfied that the appellant had acted 
with reasonable care in relation to the £6,230.28, 
which she awarded him, and in those circumstances, 
she ought to have awarded him the full sum claimed. 
This is in law the redemptive power of the instructions 
given by the appellant to cancel the debit card, which 
instructions the bank in fact failed to act upon. It might 
have been open to the bank to argue that, since the 
original parting with the card and information was 
the cause of the loss, they should not be liable for 
that. However, they have not chosen to cross-appeal. 
I accept that that was the proper course given their 
failure to act on the cancellation instructions, but it 
cannot be used as a weapon against them and does 
not invalidate the main findings of the District judge’s 
careful judgment.
19. Therefore, for the reasons which I have given, I do not 
allow this appeal on any of the grounds which I have 
permitted to go forward.
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Commentary on appeal judgment
By Stephen Mason and Nicholas Bohm
Knowledge of the savings account
The judge addressed the issue of how the thief obtained 
knowledge of Mr Rahman’s savings account. The District 
Judge at trial concluded, at paragraph 15, that Mr Rahman 
‘… disclosed enough sensitive information to enable the 
fraudsters to use the card and to know he had a Bonus 
Savings account and roughly how much was in it.’ This 
conclusion was based on her assessment of Mr Rahman’s 
evidence, not, it appears, any evidence submitted by 
the bank. Counsel for Mr Rahman speculated that an 
employee of the bank might have revealed the existence 
of the account. However, the thief used the card to find 
out the balance on the account on various occasions by 
interrogating ATMs. This is one of the problems with the 
‘benefits’ that banks provide their customers, whether 
they want them or not: that is, the ability to check 
balances on every account held at the bank, and the 
ability to effect transfers between accounts. This means 
that if a thief obtains a card, they are able, providing they 
are capable of circumventing the PIN or know the PIN, to 
check the status of any accounts that the card permits 
them to do.
The appeal judge said at paragraph 15:
‘The District Judge clearly took the view that that was 
not the obvious explanation as to how the fraudster 
would have known what other accounts the appellant 
held. Indeed, it seems to me that the District Judge 
was right to find that that was far from obvious. Unless 
the fraudster had known of the additional account, 
whatever purpose would he have had in telephoning 
the bank so swiftly after receiving the debit card 
and before embarking upon the second and most 
substantial withdrawal from the current account, which 
would not have been effective without first having 
arranged the transfer? The District Judge’s inference 
can be reasonably based on the raft of facts which she 
found, including the conduct of the fraudster and the 
appellant. I have considered the suggestion but have 
ultimately come to the conclusion that her finding was 
within reasonable parameters.’
However, there are problems with this conclusion. It does 
not seem as if any evidence was given as to:
(i) the number of occasions the thief used ATMs to 
establish the balance on the account or accounts;
(ii) whether the card could be used to establish 
whether there were any other accounts linked to the 
current account;
(ii) where the ATMs were located;
(iii) what activities were recorded;
(iv) how many times ATMs were interrogated;
(v) on what dates and at what times the ATMs were 
used.
With the deepest possible respect, it is not obvious that 
Mr Rahman gave this information to the thief. Given 
the lies that Mr Rahman told, it is a possibility that he 
informed the thief that he had a savings account, and it is 
perhaps a reasonable inference to make. However, this 
is not the only way the thief could have found out about 
the account, and arguably evidence should have been 
adduced on this precise point by the bank.
The transfer of funds between accounts
The most significant issue on appeal relates to the 
transfer of funds between Mr Rahman’s savings account 
and his current account. Of fundamental significance is 
the burden of proof in this case. It is for the bank to prove 
either that it had authority from the customer, or that the 
customer’s breach of duty caused the bank to be deceived 
into believing that it had his authority. In addressing this 
issue, the judge indicated, at paragraph 9, that:
‘What she concluded was that what the bank would 
have done as a matter of course would have been to 
identity the caller before transferring funds from one 
of the appellant’s accounts to the other. There was 
no question that the appellant was the caller and the 
bank clearly erred in its identification of the caller, 
but the District Judge was satisfied that the appellant 
was sufficiently responsible for the error, by reason 
of the release of his debit card bearing confidential 
information and the giving of other information to the 
fraudster, to relieve the bank of ultimate responsibility.
In the third paragraph to paragraph 9, the judge said 
that ‘The bank did not put before the court any detailed 
evidence about the security information it sought from 
the fraudster. It had no record of that transaction, save in 
general terms.’ (Also see paragraphs 31 and 31 of the trial 
judgment). Herein lies the rub – the bank failed to provide 
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any substantive evidence of the information it required to 
authenticate the customer. It is not certain what method 
the thief used to effect the transfer. The District Judge said 
in her judgment at paragraph 31 that:
‘Unfortunately, the defendant has not been able to 
produce any information as to the precise way in which 
the transfer was effected. Its records show it was over 
the telephone but not whether this was by speaking 
to someone at a call centre or automatically by keying 
in the sort code, account number, passcode and 
registration key.’
Given the facts that the bank was unable to provide such 
evidence, it is difficult to understand how Mr Rahman can 
be held to be negligent.
If speaking to a bank employee, until Mr Rahman was 
made aware of the questions that the bank asked to 
enable the transfer to take place carried out the transfer, 
it cannot be certain that the information that Mr Rahman 
gave to the thief was sufficient to enable the transfer to 
take place. In particular, the inference that Mr Rahman 
must have provided the necessary information depends 
on whether the information was really information that 
was not otherwise available to a thief. That enquiry is 
not necessarily easy, but it cannot be undertaken at all 
without knowing what information the thief actually 
gave the bank. It is important to be made aware of the 
precise questions asked, and second, to establish that the 
bank obtained correct answers to each question. As the 
District Judge indicated in paragraph 33 of her judgment, 
the thief failed to answer some of the questions asked 
at Watches of Switzerland adequately, and the same 
might have occurred with the answers supplied by the 
thief to the bank when attempting to transfer the funds 
from one account to the other. If the answers were not 
satisfactory, and the bank effected the transfer on the 
basis of incorrect answers, then it is liable to Mr Rahman 
for negligence or for effecting a transaction that was not 
authorised.7 
It is of the utmost significance that this point was 
dismissed. It appears that two judges are prepared to 
accept that a bank need do next to nothing to meet the 
required burden of proof. If a bank is permitted to effect 
a transfer of money between accounts and authorise the 
debit of an account with wholly inadequate evidence, and 
nevertheless escapes liability for its breach of the banking 
mandate, then there is no incentive for a bank to bother 
with obtaining evidence in the future.
The transfer of funds did not cause a loss
The judge concluded in the third paragraph to paragraph 
9 that ‘…the transfer of funds from one account of the 
appellant’s accounts to another caused him no loss. It 
was the extraction of funds from the current account by 
the use of the debit card which led to the loss.’ It seems 
impossible for the thief to have purchased the watch 
without the transfer having taken place, so the transfer of 
the funds caused the thief to be able to steal the funds.
Quality of the means of authentication
The District Judge dismissed the vague answers to the 
questions put to the thief by the bank when the thief 
was in the process of buying the watch at Watches of 
Switzerland on the basis that it was possible the Mr 
Rahman gave the thief the information. The evidence from 
the bank was that the answers to two of the questions 
posed were vague at best. It is somewhat disconcerting 
to conclude that banks authorise high value transactions 
based on nebulous information. In this instance, it 
appears clear that the bank, by its own admission, failed 
to authenticate the holder of the card effectively, or at all. 
For this reason, the bank ought to have been held liable 
for debiting the account without authority.
Usual pattern
There are two aspects to the argument that Mr Rahman’s 
card was being used for a series of unusual transactions. 
The evidence relating to the purchase of the watch 
certainly seems to have been that this transaction 
was outside the normal course of use on the account. 
However, given that there was a transfer from the savings 
account to the current account before the purchase, and 
also given the bank purportedly authenticated that it was 
Mr Rahman that was buying the watch, this contention 
has little merit. However, the withdrawal of cash from an 
ATM and the interrogation of ATMs for balance enquiries 
on several occasions were outside the normal pattern 
of behaviour. On an evidential note, it is not clear which 
ATMs were used, and whether they were across London, 
nor which account or accounts were interrogated – this is 
important evidence to substantiate the claim.
On this point, the District Judge concluded at paragraph 
34 that customers:
‘… become irate (and it causes them embarrassment 
and inconvenience) if their card is blocked when they 
try to use it for a genuine transaction. Looking at 
the record of transactions on 14 November, I am not 
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satisfied that the defendant should have suspected 
unauthorised use on that date.’
There are two observations on these comments: first, 
just because a customer becomes irate is no reason 
for a shop or bank to accept that the person who has 
possession of a genuine debit card is the rightful owner 
of the account, especially when they cannot answers 
questions accurately. If the bank prefers to avoid the 
risk of annoying a purported customer who cannot 
answer questions correctly, it should accept the loss if 
the purported customer is a thief. This is precisely akin 
to the case where a bank prefers not to check signatures 
on small value cheques, and accepts any resulting loss. 
Second, it is a mistake to compare the transactions (if this 
is what the District Judge did) during the course of one 
month. To establish a rough pattern of use, it is relevant 
to look back at a period of twelve months or longer (and 
given the account had only been open for three years, this 
would not have been a difficult exercise to undertake) – by 
so doing, it can then be established whether Mr Rahman 
altered his pattern of spending in such a way as to enable 
the bank to conclude that buying an expensive watch was 
within the normal pattern of use.
Failure of the bank to deliver up evidence
Even in 2013, employees of banks continue to advise 
customers, incorrectly, to destroy evidence (that is, their 
card) in circumstance such as these (although in this 
case Mr Rahman gave his card to the thief). The point 
made by counsel for Mr Rahman in his grounds of appeal 
was apposite and highly relevant: that the bank had 
failed, despite repeated pre-action correspondence, to 
preserve relevant evidence. It must be emphasised that 
the ‘findings by a court must be justifiable, and meet the 
demands of rationality and ethics’.8 To this extent, ‘the 
resistance, especially of banks, to submit proper evidence 
to support their assertions, in particular with respect to 
unauthorised withdrawals from ATMs and on-line banking 
disputes’ should be the topic of constant vigilance by 
lawyers and judges alike.9 
General comments
When a claimant supports his claim with dishonest 
evidence, it is not surprising to find every possible 
inference drawn against him. Judges are human. What 
is unfortunate about this appeal is the court’s failure to 
focus firmly on the importance of requiring the bank to 
discharge the burden of proving that the crucial transfer 
between accounts either was authorised by the claimant 
(which was clearly not the case) or was facilitated by 
the claimant’s breach of duty in supplying information 
to the thief which was used to impersonate him to the 
bank. To discharge that burden, the bank ought to have 
produced evidence of exactly how the telephone transfer 
was purportedly authorised. No explanation was given 
for its failure to do so. If the information supplied to the 
bank in support of the authorisation had been before the 
court, there would have been a proper basis for reaching 
a conclusion about whether that information had, on 
the balance of probabilities, come from the claimant, 
or could have been found by an astute thief from other 
sources. If it came from the claimant, his case would fail; 
but if with equal or greater probability it could have come 
from elsewhere, the bank’s system would have failed to 
provide evidence sufficient to discharge the burden of 
proof on the bank.
If banks can succeed in defending claims by their 
customers without producing evidence on the crucial 
issue of their authority to debit an account, they will have 
no incentive to retain it or to produce it when required. If 
their defence fails for lack of the relevant evidence, they 
will soon enough learn to make sure to retain and produce 
it. Soft cases make bad law.
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